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JURISDICTION TO DIVORCE-A STUDY IN STARE DECISIS
ORRIN B. EvANs*
The practical importance of the migratory divorce problem is probably
over rated, despite the facts that legal certainty of the marital status of
its members is essential to every community and that strong convictions
on all phases -of divorce practice are commonly, divergently, and provincially
held. Except in a few localities, best known by their very peculiarity in
this respect, the number of migratory divorces is too small for the really
difficult questions to "pay their way" in a lawyer's practice," and the number
of cases in which there is any serious question of the universal validity of
the decree is even smaller. One writer has described the possibility of
migratory divorce as a "sort of social safety valve" for those blocked from
escape from marital frustration by the unyielding policy of the state in
which they live.
2
Analysis of the considerable legal literature on the subject discloses that
the primary concern-not always recognized-of the eminent writers is to
measure the decisions by the standards of the doctrine of stare decisis. In
other words, because there have been apparent deviations from what might
be expected by the principles of deductive logic, the effort has been (a) to
point out the inconsistencies of the law or (b) to effect a reconciliation
by restatement of the premise. The cases at least suggest an alternative
thesis-the limited utility of stare decisis.
Daily we teach that the imposing edifice of the common law consists
of a multitude of decisions, resting one upon the other, and each finding
authority and substance from the support it derives from those beneath
and beside it. The ability to ascertain "the holding" of a case is the "sine
qua non" of the student and woe betide the simple scholar who puts his
trust in obiter. Fortunately, few law students, and unfortunately, few law-
yers, read essays in jurisprudence, so they seldom discover there is some
uncertainty in defining the 'holdings" so as to distinguish the dictum, even
*Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri. A.B., University of
Wisconsin, 1931, LL.B., 1935; J.S.D., Yale University, 1940.
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among the initiated, nor appreciate the essential conflict between the
restriction of the binding force of precedent to the precise holding of the
case and a dynamic system of law, capable of embracing new situations and
changing conditions. Stare decisis is the essence of the common law and by
its application, it is said, decision of the case becomes a matter of law, not
of the personal judicial opinion; the decision can be forecast in advance,
which means that the law is certain; the freedom from the strangling stric-
tures of legislation permits adaptation to new conditions; and the decision
of only the issues squarely before the court directs inquiry and concentrates
exhaustive argument upon the very real problem to be solved.3 These are
the distinguishing advantages of the common law system and if the
principles of stare decisis are inconsistent with the virtues claimed for it,
there is reason for concern for our entire legal tradition.
Even momentary reflection discloses that judicial precedent is an
illusory guide to decision of a new case-and all undecided cases are new, if
for no other reason than the passing of time. By hypothesis the facts are
different, which means that inquiry is focused on the question, how differ-
ent, in what respect different, from the nearest analogy. The original "pre-
cedent" was necessarily decided on issues of social policy. It is not necessary,
under the doctrine of stare decisis, to re-examine those considerations in
an exact successor case, but as the facts are different, determination of
whether the difference is so significant as to require re-examination of the
entire question can itself only be had by passing-consciously or otherwise
-- on the same social factors. Precedent indicates the future path of the law
only to the extent that the rationale of the opinion is broader than the
decision on the precise facts before the court, and to preserve the common
law from complete sterility it is necessary to include a minimum of such
generalization within the definition of the holdings of the case. There is no
logic which says, this abstraction is holding, all beyond is dictum. It is a
matter of guessing the point at which public opinion of the particular period
in history is agreed that the identity of social considerations is beyond con-
troversy.
The history of nearly a thousand years has demonstrated that fact
combinations can he classified into categories in which certain common facts
will be generally accepted as primarily important in their impact upon the
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approved code of conduct, so that the solution of one case is applicable to
all, but logic is the hand-maiden of experience-to paraphrase the great
justice-and the particular case must be brought within the premise of the
syllogism by extraneous mental processes.4 There is a great no-man's land
of the law in which it is assumed with equal unanimity that the facts of the
new case are not sufficiently analogous to precedent to permit decision by
stare decisis, but it is usually only the laymen who complain about the un-
certainty of the law, and professional literature is overwhelmingly devoted
to the cases where the applicability of precedent is disputed, to attempts at
reclassifications, and to restatements of the generalizations on which they
;ire based. Critics of the doctrine of stare decisis concede, as indeed they
must, that it has furnished a workable degree of certainty of law. Their
complaint is that it has induced an undue rigidity in the law, that for free-
dom from arbitrary and capricious, judicial conduct too great a price has
been paid in neglect of economic, political, and ethical objectives involved
in the decision, that it has been strained to resolve cases where the differ-
ence in facts-particularly the difference involved in the passage of time
from one historical period to another-from the precedents available are
so great that the assumption of analogy is unjustified. When a court adopts
the philosophy of these writers and evinces a willingness to re-examine the
bases of the precedents cited to it, frequently overturning decisions admit-
tedly in point-as well as distinguishing decisions rendered in another era,
the legal profession is aroused by the undermining effect upon traditional
legal technique-in short, stare decssis-more than by the new decisions
themselves.
If it is a virtue of the common law that the court considers only the
case before it, it is also true that the decision rendered can have dynamic
effect as precedent only by rationalization to a principle broader than the
facts of the case, which is the essence of legislation. Both defenders and
critics of stare decisis are thus in a paradoxical situation, the former seek-
ing the development of case-law by a principle legislative in character, the
latter restricting judicial activity to the precise case before the court but
recommending a typically legislative freedom in the solution of that case.
Only one court may speak positively on the United States Constitution.
The question of the application of the full faith and credit clauses to a
4. See Cook, Scientific Method and the Law (1927) 13 AM. B. A. J. 303.
5. U. S. CONsT. Art. IV, § 1.
19431
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decree of divorce is -elatively a narrow one. The total number of decisions
by that tribunal on jurisdiction to divorce is neither too large to compare
collectively nor too small to permit the various aspects of study. We have,
then, a fair culture for laboratory examination of stare decisis in action.
The earliest expression of the court on the extrastate validity of a di-
vorce decree may be found in Cheever v. Wilson,6 a suit by the divorced
husband for a share of the rents from separate property of the divorced
wife granted him in the divorce decree for the support of the children. As
the validity of the divorce was not put in issue by proper pleading, the
court's opinion lacks the conclusiveness which might otherwise be attributed
to it. However, it was rendered as an alternative ground for decision, after
full argument, and with the express purpose of avoiding future litigation on
the subject. The wife's parental home was in Indiana. Her own domicile
before marriage was not in evidence. Apparently the marriage was cele-
brated in Indiana and the parties immediately and at all times thereafter
had their matrimonial domicile in Washington, D. C., where the events
which were the grounds for divorce occurred. It was conceded by all parties
that the husband there "abandoned" the wife, though whether or not for
cause was disputed. At that time a divorce a vincalo was not possible in
the District of Columbia. In February, 1857, she returned to her parental
home in Indiana. In June of the same year she sued for divorce in the court
of that state, pursuant to statute reading,
"Divorces may be decreed by the Circuit Court of this state on
petition, filed by any person at the time a bona fide resident of the
county in which the same is filed; of which bona fide residence the
affidavit of such petition shall be prima facie evidence ... "
The husband appeared, answered, and filed a cross bill also praying
for divorce. The divorce sought by both parties was granted, the wife re-
married and left Indiana within the year, and her second husband died before
the instant case came on for trial.
On this record, the court asserted that "if a judgment is conclusive in
a State where it is rendered, it is equally conclusive everywhere;" that
there was not sufficient evidence to overcome the finding of residence stated
in the decree of divorce (the court expressly found it unnecessary to consider
whether such finding was conclusive or only prima facie determinative);
and that a married woman might acquire "a separate domicile whenever it
6. 9 Wall. (U. S. 108 (1869).
[Vol. 8
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-is necessary or proper that she should do so. . . . The proceeding for a
divorce may be instituted where the wife has her domicile. The place of the
-marriage, of the offence, and the domicile of the husband are of no con-
sequence .... "7
A decade later, in Maynard v. Hill,8 the court faced the problem again.
Husband and wife had intermarried in Vermont and for some years main-
tained a matrimonial domicile there. Shortly after they had moved to
-Ohio, the husband left his family to go west, promising to send for them
soon and to send means of support in the meantime. He did neither. Locating
in the territory of Oregon, he settled upon a tract of land which he claimed
as a married man. There was presently enacted, presumably at his instiga-
tion, by the Legislative Assembly of the Territory, an act purporting to
dissolve the bonds of matrimony between him and his wife. She had no
notice of any of these circumstances until after they occurred and was not
within the Territory at the time. He subsequently remarried.
Only one-half of the lands upon which he settled were granted to
him, because of the interruption in his marital status. The other half was
later patented to the defendants. The case was a suit by the heirs of the
first wife to charge the defendants as trustees and to compel a conveyance.
The opinion is devoted largely to a discussion of the validity of legisla.
tive divorces in general. Concluding that.they were effective in the absence
'of state constitutional prohibition, the court observed,
"... we cannot inquire into its motives in passing the act
granting the divorce; its will was a sufficient reason for its action.
. .. If the assembly possessed the power to grant a divorce in any
case, its jurisdiction to legislate upon his status, he being a resident
of the Territory, is undoubted.... The facts alleged in the bill of
complaint, that no cause existed for the divorce, and that it was
obtained without the knowledge of the- wife, cannot affect the
-validity of the act. Knowledge or ignorance of parties of intended
legislation does not affect its validity, if within the competency of
the legislature. . ... -
Judgment dismissing the bill was affirmed.
7. Id. at 124.
8. 125 U. S. 190 (1888).
9. Id. at 209.
19431]
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October term, 1900, was studded with divorce cases. Two of them,
Bell v. Bell 0 and Streitwolf v. Streitwolf,11 present the other side of the
picture. In the former, the marriage was celebrated in Illinois and the
matrimonial domicile was in New York. The husband obtained a decree
of divorce in Pennsylvania, there being service upon the wife by publication
and by mail. She was at no time in Pennsylvania and in the instant case
it was found that the husband was never a bona fide resident of that state
as required by its law. (The reported evidence would seem fully to sus-
tain the finding.) In a suit by the wife for divorce in New York, it was
held that the Pennsylvania divorce was void, need not be accorded faith
and credit, and was not a defense. In Streitwolf v. Streitwolf, the parties
were married and maintained their matrimonial domicile in New Jersey,
where the wife instituted proceedings for divorce. While the suit was pend-
ing, the husband went to North Dakota and obtained a divorce, a sum-
mons and copy of the complaint being served on the wife in New Jersey.
The recited facts show very plainly that the husband was never domiciled
in North Dakota, nor a bona fide resident there for ninety days as required
-by its statute. The court held that the North Dakota divorce was void, not
entitled to full faith and credit, and that it need not be considered a defense
in the New Jersey proceeding. The opinion refers to Bell v. Bell for authority,
where it was said,
"No valid divorce from the bond of matrimony can be decreed
on constructive service by the courts of a State in which neither
,party is domiciled. And by the law of Pennsylvania every petitioner
for a divorce must have had a bona fide residence within the State
for one year next before the filing the petition .... The recital in
the proceedings in Pennsylvania of the facts necessary to show juris-
diction may be contradicted. . . .Upon this record, therefore, the
court in Pennsylvania had no jurisdiction of the husband's suit for
divorce, because neither party had a domicile in Pennsylvania .... ,,12
Atherton v. Atlerton13 was a suit for divorce in New York by a wife
who had been domiciled in that state prior to her marriage there to de-
fendant, who was at all times domiciled in Kentucky. They went at once
to Kentucky, which became and remained the matrimonial domicile until
10. 181 U. S. 175 (1901).
11. 181 U. S. 179 (1900)
12. 181 U. S. at 177.
13. 181 U. S. 155 (1900).
[Vol. 8
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she left him to return to New York. Whether she had cause for separating
from him was, of course, a principal subject of dispute. The husband sued
for divorce in Kentucky, alleging desertion, stating that she had been out-
side the state for more than four months, and giving her correct New York
post office address. As provided for by statute in such cases, that court
appointed an attorney to represent the absent spouse, who wrote her
without receiving a reply or a return of the undelivered letter. A decree of
divorce was rendered, which the defendant set up as a defence to the principal
action. The New York court found that the wife had left her husband be-
cause of his cruel and abusive treatment, that the Kentucky divorce was
void as to her, and that it was not a defence. On writ of error, the Supreme
Court reversed the decision below as denying full faith and credit to the
Kentucky judgment.
The opinion by Mr. Justice Gray is an interesting subject of study in
analysis of the doctrine of stare decisis. After extended quotations from
opinions broadly asserting jurisdiction to divorce at the domicile of one
party only, interspersed with observations and rationalizations of his own
to such extent that it was difficult to determine whether or not he is adopt-
ing the quotations as his own,14 and more abbreviated reference to the
opposing authority, the Justice concluded,
"The authorities above cited show the wide diversity of opin-
ion existing upon this important subject, and admonish us to confine
our decision to the exact case before us.
"This case does not involve the validity of a divorce granted
on constructive notice, by the court of a State in which only one
of the parties ever had a domicil; nor the question to what extent
the good faith of the domicil may be afterwards inquired into. In
this case, the divorce in Kentucky was by the court of the State
which had always been the undoubted domicil of the husband, and
which was the only matrimonial domicil of the husband and
wife. .. ."
After restating the facts, the Justice continued,
"We are of the opinion that the undisputed facts show that
such efforts were required by the statutes of Kentucky, and were
actually made, to give the wife actual notice of the-suit in Ken-
14. It was the opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes that he did approve of that
position. See dissent, Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562, 631 (1906).
15. 181 U. S. at 170-171.
1943]
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tucky, as to make the decree of the court there, granting a divorce
upon the ground that she had abandoned her husband, as binding
on her as if she had been served with notice in Kentucky, or had
voluntarily appeared in the suit. Binding her to that full extent,
it established, beyond contradiction, that she had abandoned her
husband, and precludes her from asserting that she left him on ac-
count of his cruel treatment.
"To hold otherwise would make it difficult, if not impossible,
for the husband to obtain a divorce for the cause alleged, if it
actually existed . . . [otherwise] the husband could only get a
divorce by suing in the State in which she was found; and by the
very fact of suing her there he would admit she had acquired a
separate domicil, (which he denied,) and disprove his own ground
of-action that she had abandoned him in Kentucky."16
Judgment was reversed, because the New York court had failed to
give full faith and credit to the Kentucky decree.
If we respect the admonition of the court and look only to the portion
of the opinion purporting to deal with the facts before it, it is evident the
opinion sheds little light on the fundamental questions involved. The de-
claration that the extra-territorial service was binding on .the wife was mere
fiat unless she was at all times domiciled in law in Kentucky. Whether or
not she was so domiciled depended upon facts which were the very essence
of the dispute and were not in the record before the court. Concern for a
husband, presumed to have been abandoned without cause, may be bal-
anced by concern for a wife, who may be presumed with equal ease to
have been driven from her matrimonial home by a cruel husband (as Mr.
Justice Peckham and Chief Justice Fuller, dissenting, making clear.) The
dilemma can only be solved by federal determination of which state has
paramount interest in the status of the parties.
Let us pause here to recapitulate. Two cases, involving facts as nearly
identical as are likely to occur, assert that a divorce granted in a state in
which -neither husband nor wife were ever domiciled (as established by
inquiry de novo) and in which personal service is not obtained on the de-
fendant but formally granted, nevertheless, pursuant to state law requiring
the bona Jide residence of the petitioning party, is -not entitled to full faith
and credit in another state. So far as the opinions show, the court was
primarily influenced by the fact that the jurisdictional requirements of the
16. Id. at 172-173.
(Vol. 8
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state divorce statutes were not satisfied,17 and there is little in either opinion
to indicate that a state might not exercise conclusive-jurisdiction though"
neither party were domiciled there. It should also be noted that the de-
fendants were not served within the state. Streitwolf v. Streitwolf could be
decided on the ground of stare decisis because all would agree that differ-
ences in the persons, habits, and particular states from those involved in
Bell v. Bell were unimportant. But would differences in the state laws
on jurisdiction to divorce lead to different results. I think not, because
I feel reasonably sure that regardless of its own law, no state may exercise
divorce jurisdiction if neither party to the suit is domiciled there, but
so far as these cases are concerned, I can reach that conclusion only by
substituting for the rationale of the court another premise, equally con-
sistent with the result. If such a process unduly enlarges the concept of
the "holding" of the case,' 8 then the doctrine of stare decisis is of little
assistance in determining this phase of divorce jurisdiction.
Three cases sustain the validity of the decrees. The opinion in Cheever
v. Wilson was written with the express purpose of guiding the future course
of the law. Is it to have that effect, when the case could have been decided
on rules of procedure? If it is to have any force as precedent, it must assert
either (1) that domicile of either party is unnecessary or (2), what the
court declared, that a wife may under proper circumstances acquire a sep-
17. The opinion in the Streitwolf case, after stating that the issue is the same
as in Bell v. Bell, proceeds entirely on this ground.
18. WAMBAUGH (2d ed. 1894), THE STmY oF CASES, -p. 24. "A case is not
precedent for any proposition that was neither consciously or unconsciously in the
mind of the court . . . Further, if it can be shown that, although there was no
deliberation, a particular point was wholly absent from consideration of the court,
then, even though that point is conceivably an important one, the connection of
the decision with that point is not a connection of effect and cause, but is purely
accidental, and as to that point the decision is no authority whatever." This state-
ment is quoted, apparently with approval, by Goodhart, Three Cases on Possession(1928) 3 CAME. L. J. 195.
Cf. Oliphant, A Return to Stare Decisis (1928), 6 AM. L. SCHOOL REV. 215,
226. "There are two lines of old cases involving the validity of promises not to
compete. They are considered in square conflict. But when the opinions are ig-
nored and the facts re-examined all the cases holding the promises invalid are
found to be cases of employees' promises not to compete with their employers after
a term of employment Contemporary guild regulations not noticed in the opinions
made these holdings eminently sound. All the cases holding the promises valid
were cases of promises by those selling a business and promising not to compete
with the purchasers. This distinction between these two lines of cases is not even
hinted at in any of the opinions but the court's intuition of experience led them
to follow it with amazing sureness and the law resulting fitted life. That is a
sample of the stuff capable of scientific study."
1943 ]
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arate domicile, and that in the instant case, she had done so, for the state
of the forum was never the domicile of the husband. Why, then, did the
court, in Atherton v. Atherton, so readily conclude that extra-territorial
service on the wife precluded her from showing a justified abandonment of
her husband? It could be found that she was still domiciled in the state
of the forum and hence bound by the service only by assuming the very
fact at issue, and which by the service she was precluded from contradicting.
Maynard v. Hill was perhaps broad enough to support Atherton v.
Atherton. In fact, the discussion of any theory of jurisdiction was so brief
that the case could fairly stand for any generalization which does not do
violence to other and accepted legal concepts pertinent to the facts. But
Maynard v. Hill was not even cited in the Atherton opinion. And that case
declined to be used as a precedent for other than the precise facts involved.
So we have at this point, not one case but a line of five cases. How
helpful was the doctrine of stare decisis in deciding them? How clearly does
it indicate the path of future decisions?
In Andrews v. Andrews 0 the husband and wife had been married and
had maintained their matrimonial domicile in Massachusetts. He went to
South Dakota for the purpose of obtaining a divorce, lived there for not
quite a year, engaging in no other business there, and voted in a state
election there. A sufficient time having elapsed to satisfy the state statute,
he filed petition for divorce for a cause which would not have been ground
for divorce in Massachusetts. His wife received notice of the proceeding
and entered an appearance by counsel, filing an answer which controverted
both the jurisdiction of the court and the merits of the suit. However, an
agreement was entered into between husband and wife pursuant to which
she "withdrew her appearance" and shortly thereafter the divorce was
decreed. He immediately returned to Massachusetts, shortly thereafter met
and married a second "wife," and had two children. The first wife made no
claim upon her husband after the divorce but upon his death asserted the
right to administer the estate as his lawful widow. The highest state court
in Massachusetts found in her favor, deciding that the husband had never
been domiciled in South Dakota and following a Massachusetts statute which
provided ". . . if an inhabitant of this Commonwealth goes into another
State or country to obtain a divorce.., for a cause which would not author-
-19. 188 U. S. 14 (1902).
(Vol. 8
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ize a divorce by the laws of this Commonwealth, a di':orce so obtained shall
be of no force or effect in this Commonwealth." On writ of error, the
Supreme Court affirmed the judgment by a five to three decision.
For the first time there is an extended discussion of marriage as a social
institution and of the concern of a particular state over the marital status
of its citizens. Concluded'Mr. Justice White, "As the State of Massach-
usetts had exclusive jurisdiction over its citizens concerning the marriage
tie and its dissolution, and consequently the authority to prohibit them
from perpetrating a fraud upon the law of their domicil by temporarily
sojourning in another State, and there, without acquiring a bona fide domicile,
procuring a decree of divorce, it follows that the South Dakota . . . court
[was] without jurisdiction, and hence the due faith and credit clause of the
Constituion of the Unied States did not require the enforcement of such
decree in the State of Massachusetts against the public policy of that State
as expressed in its statutes. Indeed, this application of the general principle
is not open to dispute, since it has been directly sustained by decisions of
this court. Bell v. Bell, Streitwolf v. Streitwolf .... A like rule, by inverse
reasoning, was also applied in the case of Atlherton v. Atherton .... It hav-
ing been established that Kentucky was the domicil of the husband and had
ever been the matrimonial domicil . . . therefore, that the courts of Ken-
tucky had jurisdiction over the subject matter....
I have said before that I think this proposition-that a state in which
neither party is domiciled has no jurisdiction to divorce them-is good law.
We are concerned here with the influence of precedent upon the decision.
In the first place, it readily may be conceded that the rule announced is
not inconsistent with the judgments entered in the preceding cases. In only
Bell v. Bell and Streitwolf v. Streitwolf was the power of the second state
to refuse recognition to the divorce sustained, as it was here. Where the
"foreign" divorce was held universally effective, the facts of domicile were
quite different. But it will be recalled that in those cases (Bell v. Bell and
Streitwolf v. Streitwolf) the decision was assertedly rested upon failure to
satisfy the jurisdictional requirements imposed upon its own courts by the
state in which the decree was obtained. (It is interesting to note that this
same principle could have been applied to the instant case to reach the
same result.) The only general rule announced in the Bell case was in these
19a. Id. at 37, 38.
19431
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words: "No valid divorce from the bond of matrimony can be decreed on
constructive service by the courts of a State in which neither party is domi-
ciled." 20 (Italics mine).
In the Andrews case the wife had appeared by attorney, which would
seem to take the case out of the principle just quoted. But the court here
said,21 in reply to that contention,
"... the rulings in the cases referred to were predicated upon
the proposition that jurisdiction over the subject matter depended
upon domicil, and without such domicil there was no authority
to decree a divorce. This becomes apparent when it is considered
that the cases referred to were directly rested upon ... Thompson
v. Whitmnan."
Reference to the opinions discloses that Thompson v. Whitma. 22 was
cited for the single proposition that "the recital in the proceedings in
Pennsylvania of the facts necessary to show jurisdiction may be contra-
dicted."28
To rely on cases sustaining the validity of the decrees of divorce for
the result reached in Andrews v. Andrews is at best stare dictis, not stare
decisis. In view of the express limitation put upon the opinion in the
Atherton case, as well as the theory of valid service and constructive domi-
cile there adopted, it is an extraordinary extension of any previous defini-
tion of the "holding" of the case to rely upon it here. Cheever v. Wilson
is not cited at all and Maynard v. Hill only for the proposition that mar-
riage creates a problem of status as well as a civil contract. A'ndrews v.
Andrews is therefore, less the inevitable consequence of prior holdings, fore-
seeable and predictable by their light, than a re-examination of the funda-
mental issues, a statement of a new principle, and a re-classification and
interpretation of the precedent to conform to it. Surely there was reason
thereafter to believe that stare decisis could guide the profession in the law
of jurisdiction to divorce.
Suppose husband and wife were married in New York where they were
both domiciled and that without ever establishing a matrimonial domicile
there, the husband almost immediately removes to Connecticut, where he
lives for the rest of his life, the wife at all times remaining in New York.
20. 181 U. S. at 177.
21. 188 U. S. at 39.
22. 18 WaIl. (U. S.) 457 (1873).
23. 181 U. S. at 178.
[Vol. 8
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The reason for the separation-whether there was abandonment or deser-
tion by either party-is, of course, bitterly disputed. Many years after
the separation, the husband obtains a divorce in Connecticut on the ground
of desertion, the wife being served only by publication and by letter mailed
to her in New York. Must such a divorce be granted full faith and credit
so as to be a conclusive defense to a subsequent suit in New York brought
by the "wife" for limited divorce and alimony, personal service being ob-
tained on the "husband?" Those were the facts and that the issue of the
celebrated case of Haddock v. Haddock.24
The facts differ from the cases which have gone before in some ways
we can at once dismiss as immaterial. All will agree that whether the
divorce were granted in Indiana, Oregon, Kentucky, or Connecticut, for
example, should not affect the result; perhaps, also, the particular miscon-
duct for which divorce is permitted by state law. The only significant factual
difference from Maynard v. Hill is that in that case it was a legislative di-
vorce whose validity was in question, but the legal issue was perhaps distin-
guishable. Maynard v. Hill was a suit involving title to land in the very state
which granted the divorce, so the only constitutional grounds upon which
the decree could be collaterally attacked was that of lack of "due process."
Is jurisdiction which satisfies the due process clause the same jurisdiction
which entitles a decree to full faith and credit?
In Atherton v. Atherton, it will be recalled, the divorce was obtained
at the last (in fact, the only) matrimonial domicile, which the wife had left.
In Wilson v. Cheevers the defendant had been served in the jurisdiction and
had appeared in court. The court was of the opinion, in Haddock v. Had-
dock, that these differences justified the different result, and held-five
justices to four-that the New York court was not Constitutionally bound
to recognize the divorced status of the parties. It also asserted that the
Connecticut divorce did not deny the wife due process of law and was
valid in that state. The decision incited a barrage of criticism, long sus-
tained and of multi-calibred artillery.25 It was argued that as an original
24. 201 U. S. 562 (1906).
25. A partial list of articles includes: Herbert, Foreign Divorce Jurisdiction-
Full Faith and Credit (1936) 8 Miss. L. J. 397; Leflar, Jurisdiction to Grant
Divorces (1935) 7 Miss. L. J. 445; Vreeland, Mr. and Mrs. Haddock (1934) 20
A. B. A. J. 568; Parks, Some Problems in Jurisdiction to Divorce (1929) 13 MINN.
L. REv. 525; Parks, Jurisdiction to Divorce (1927) 35 Mo. BUL., LAW SERIEs 3;
Beale, Constitutional Protection of Decrees for Divorce (1906) 19 Htv. L. REV.
586; Beale, Haddock Revisited (1926) 39 HAv. L. REv. 417; Schofield, The Doc-
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question, jurisdiction to divorce could not be predicated in part upon juris-
diction of the person and part upon jurisdiction of the subject matter, but
must rest entirely upon one or the other; that the proposition that a divorce
was valid in one state and not entitled to the same credit in another was
self contradictory; and that the result was undesirable from every social
standpoint. It was asserted that the Haddock decision could not be re-
conciled with its predecessors, and that the court misread its own opinions.
It is unlikely that I could present an original interpretation of the
decision or a thought on its merits not already exposed by the ingenuity
and industry of the commentators. The point of my paper, is, not the law
of jurisdiction to divorce, but the influence of stare decisis in its develop-
ment. I think it is immediately apparent that when the court was con-
fronted with the facts of Haddock v. Haddock, inquiry into the differences
between them and the facts of the foregoing cases raised questions quite
as profound as those of a decision de novo; that determination that the
differences were fundamental required re-determination and appraisal of
the social, political, economic and ethical factors upon which jurisdiction to
divorce must hinge; and that this would have been equally true had the
court held in favor of the extra-territorial conclusiveness of the divorce, as
in Atherton v. Atherton. Said Holmes, dissenting, "It is true that in Ather-
ton v. Atherton. Mr. Justice Gray confined the decision to the case before
the court .... But a court by announcing that its decision is confined to the
facts before it does not decide in advance that logic will not drive it further
when new facts arise. ..."2 The point is, that it does not decide in advance
what facts will make the logic applicable.
Foremost among the critics of Haddock.v. Haddock was the pre-eminent
authority on Conflict of Laws, the late Professor Joseph H. Beale .2 Twen-
ty years later Professor Beale reconsidered his position28 and approved the
trine of Haddock v. Haddock (1906) 1 ILL. L. REv. 219; Richards, The Full Faith
and Credit Clause of the Federal Constitution as Applied to Suits for Divorce(1920) 15 ILL. L. REv. 259; Lewis, Divorce and the Federal Constitution (1915)
49 AM. L. REv. 852; Berger, Extra-territorial Effect of Decree for Divorce on Con-
structive Service (1911) 45 AM. L. REv. 564; Peaslee, Ex parte Divorce (1915)
28 HAuv. L. REv. 457; Strahorn, A Rationale of the Haddock Case (1938) 32 ILL.
L. REv. 796; Bingham, The American Law Institute v. The Supreme Codrt in the,
Matter of Haddock v. Haddock (1936) 21 CORN. L. Q. 393.
26. 201 U. S. at 631.
27. Beale, Constitutional Protection of Decrees for Divorce (1906) 19 HARV.
L. REv. 586.
28. Beale, Haddock Revisited (1926) 39 HAv. L. REv. 417.
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decision, but not all the reasoning. Propounding a rationalization which
nowhere appears in the opinions, majority or minority, he observed, "It
usually takes the bar at least twenty years to appreciate the real reasons
for a novel decision that maintains itself. '29 In the meantime, itself in
apparent ignorance of the real reason for its decision, the court was preced-
ing along the traditional lines of judicial technique. In the extended opin-
ion in the Haddock cases, seven propositions were stated as settled by
precedent, but no attempt was made to summarize a single principle into
which it and they might be fitted. The Haddock case was simply dis-
tinguished from the Atherton case on the absence of matrimonial domicile
in Connecticut and the lack of constructive domicile of the wife in the state,
so that New York might not be precluded-from adjudicating the marital
status of its own citizen. When Thompson v. ThompsoiO0 came before the
Court, with facts strongly reminiscent of Atherton v. Atherton, the opinion
read, "In the Haddock case ... this court held that there was no violation
of the full faith and credit clause ... because there was not at any time a
matrimonial domicile in the State of Connecticut, and therefore the res-
the marriage status-was not within the sweep of the judicial power of that
State. In the present case it appears that the parties were married in the
State of Virginia, and had a matrimonial domicile there, and not in the
District of Columbia or elsewhere. The husband had his actual domicile
in that State at all times until and after the conclusion of the.litigation. It is
clear, therefore, under the decision in the Atherton case and the principles
upon which it rests, that the State of Virginia had jurisdiction over the mar-
riage relation, and the proper courts of that State could proceed to ad-
judicate respecting it upon grounds recognized by the laws of that State,
although the wife had left the jurisdiction and could not be reached by
formal process...."31
No inconsistency is admitted; the attempted synthesis of Andrews v.
Andrews is again ignored; the case is fortunately capable of decision by
almost exact precedent; matrimonial domicile is the decisive fact.
Haddock v. Haddock may have been inconsistent with the cases which
went before it, which necessarily means, even to the most ardent defenders
of the doctrine, that the principles of stare decisis were of little utility in
29. Id. at 426.
30. 226 U. S. 551 (1913).
31. Id. at 562.
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forecasting that decision, but with the Thompson case the line of cleavage
was definitely marked out, and the sense of certainty re-established on the
basis of a new classification. (Certainty, be it remarked, of compulsory
recognition of the foreign decree in very limited circumstances; hence no
certainty of recognition as a matter of comity.) But a classification bearing
no demonstrable relation to the underlying considerations which must
determine jurisdiction to divorce is bound to present difficulties of pigeon-
holing when a new combination of facts arises.
Under the influence of Professor Beale, the American Law Institute
restated the governing law. It is perhaps unfair to illustrate the limitations
of the doctrine of stare decisis, or even the difficulty of defining the "holding"
of a case, by comparing the decisions with the Restatement, for the latter
does not purport to follow the courts at all times and "the accuracy of the
statements of law made rests on the authority of the Institute,'32 which
has never disclosed the exact recipe by which judicial authority was sea-
soned with its own pre-science and the proportions in which judicial "have-
done," "will-do," and "should-do" were blended; and the very project of
restating the law is a commentary on the inadequacy of "our common law
system of expressing and developing law through judicial application of
existing rules to new fact combinations." 33 In the present instance, record
of what was done is very clear. Professor Beale had concluded (a bit pre-
maturely, we know today) that the Haddock decision would "stick." 34 He
had known dislike for loose ends and unreconcilable doctrines, and a posi-
tively "Blackstonian" penchant for synthesis of legal decisions. A devout
Episcopalian, 35 and highly appreciative of the sanctity of the marriage
ties, it was not difficult for him to rationalize the decision upon principles
not argued by counsel or hinted at by court in any decision to date. There
are frequent examples of this technique in legal history-indeed, its disclos-
ure is one of the advantages of a study of the subject. But until adopted
judicially, what authority supports the principle so put forward? When
32. American Law Institute, RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws (1934) In-
troduction, p. ii.
33. Ibid.
34. Beale, op. cit. supra, note 28.
35. It has been frequently remarked that Justice White, who delivered the
opinion of the court in the Haddock case, was a Catholic. It will also undoubtedly
be pointed out that Justices Murphy and Jackson, dissenting in Williams v. North
Carolina (see infra at note 43), are respectively Catholic and Episcopalian. The
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adopted, upon what precedent does it rest? Is the holding of any case any
ratio decidevdi not inconsistent with its particular judgment?36 How many
cases must not be in conflict? What is the law during the "at least twenty
years" it may take the profession to appreciate the real decision of the
case?
The Restatement took the position that a state might exercise juris-
diction to dissolve the marriage of spouses one of whom is domiciled in
the state if (1) the other is also domiciled in the state, or (2) the other
has consented that the first spouse acquire a separate home, or (3) the other
has by misconduct lost the right to object to the acquisition of a separate
home by the first spouse, or (4) if the other spouse is personally subject
to the jurisdiction of the state, or (5) if the state is the last state in which
both spouse had their matrimonial domicile11 The fifth alternative is an
obvious concession to the Haddock and Thompson cases. The second and
third alternatives are really attempts at rationalizing the fifth and Profes-
sor Beale's intention was to substitute them for it.38 It is implicit in this
formula that Maynard v. Hill was wrongly decided, and the proposition that
a divorce may be good where rendered but need not be accorded the same
recognition in other states is rejected. 9 Davis v. DavisO0 seemed to give
some judicial sanction to the Restatement thesis. Husband and wife had
maintained their matrimonial domicile in the District of Columbia, where he
obtained a divorce a menso et thoro. He subsequently sued for a divorce
a vincuio in the State of Virginia, the wife appearing specially to plead to the
jurisdiction only. The husband's domicile was found to be in Virginia and
the divorce was granted upon the same grounds as was the limited divorce
in the District of Columbia. The husband then sought relief from the
alimony and maintenance provisions of the District decree. The Supreme
Court held that the Virginia divorce was entitled to the same credit in the
District of Columbia that it had in Virginia, reversing the Court of Appeals
which had relied on Haddock v. Haddock. It first took the position that as
the decree could be attacked collaterally only for lack of jurisdiction, and
36. See note 18, supra.
37. American Law Institute, RESTATEMENT, CoNFLIcrs OF LAws (1934)
§ § 110, 111, 113.
38. See Beale, op. cit. supra, note 28.
39. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICTS OF LAws (1934) § 113, comment g.
40. 305 U. S. 32 (1938), discussed at length by Leflar, More Faith and Credit
for Divorce Decrees (1939) 4 Mo. L. REv. 268.
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as the wife had appeared in Virginia to contest that point, the Virginia
court's ruling on its jurisdiction was res adjudicata and binding upon her.
The opinion is exceedingly indefinite on just what appearance is sufficient
to have this effect, and various circumstances were recited from which an
inference might be drawn that the proceedings were also contested on the
merits. Both as a guide for future litigation as well as a logical extension
of precedent, the case is not helpful, for Andrews v. Andrews, which also
involved an appearance by the wife in the divorce proceeding denied extra-
territorial recognition, was distinguished by the simple expedient of pre-
fixing the citation by "cf." In Reno, it is common to have the absent spouse
enter an appearance by attorney to feign a contest over jurisdiction. This
may assist in the subsequent development of an estoppel,41 but I doubt if
the validity of the divorce is thereby conclusively established.
However, in the Davis case, the court did not distinguish Haddock v.
Haddock on that ground. Instead, it recited the facts to establish the dif-
ference in fault of the litigants, leading some to believe that the court might
be approaching the view of the Restatement. It has been pointed out before
that "fault" is likely to be a disputed question, and in no case has the court
indicated why the conclusion of the second court-denying full faith and
credit to the foreign decree-should be more persuasive on that issue than the
determination of the first court which granted the decree, or vice-versa,
but so far the Supreme Court has not investigated the facts independently.
We are approaching the end of the journey. In December of this year,
the newspapers reported, "Haddock v. Haddock overruled," and many
added gratuitiously, "Reno divorces upheld. '42 Just where the Williamses
and Hendrixes came from originally or where they were married, does not
appear, and so far as our precedents would indicate, it makes no difference
to us. Both families were domiciled in North Carolina when marital rela-
tionships reached the breaking point. Mr. Williams and Mrs. Hendrix went
to Nevada, stayed there six weeks, and each obtained a decree of divorce
for cruelty in which it was recited that the petitioner was a bona fide resi-
dent of the state. The absent spouses were served by publication, were
never withinL the state, and made no appearance by attorney. In the words
of Mr. Justice Jackson, promptly on the granting of the second divorce,
41.- See Harper, The Validity of Void Divorces (1930) 79 U. OF PA. L. Rsv.
158. Cf. the cases collected, Note (1936) 105 A. L. R. 817.
42. E.g., TIME MAGAZINE, Jan. 4, 1943, p. 20.
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Mr. Williams and Mrs. Hendrix "had benefit of clergy and emerged as man
and wife," immediately returning to North Carolina, where they lived to-
gether until the institution of the instant prosecution for bigamy.
At the trial, the judges charged the jury that the defendants had the
burden of proving, though not beyond a reasonable doubt, a bona fide domi-
cile in Nevada, and that a Nevada divorce based on substituted service on
the absent spouses would not be recognized in North Carolina. To both
charges, defendants excepted. The jury returned a general verdict of guilty,
and the sentence thereon was affirmed by the North Carolina Supreme
Court. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari .
4
It is immediately apparent that in all probability neither defendant was
ever domiciled in Nevada. On its face, it would seem like a typical and
flagrant case of Nevada divorce (this time, Las Vegas rather than Reno),
a circumstance which caused the newspaper outbursts referred to. However,
it is not a legal impossibility to acquire a domicile which is shortly abandoned
by reason of a bonua fide change of mind and on the facts recited by the
court, conviction might have been rested on the charge requiring, in addi-
tion to domicile, intra-state service on the defendant spouse.
If as a matter of law and upon the evidence, the jury could not have
found any party to have been domiciled in Nevada, the instruction, even if
erroneous, might not have been reversible error and the case disposed of by
a slight extension of the doctrine of A'ndrews v. Andrews. Whether this
was a possibility would depend upon the particular form of appeal originally
taken in the North Carolina courts and the state of the record before the
Supreme Court. Justice Douglas, speaking for the majority, asserted there
was concededly sufficient evidence to sustain a possible finding of domicile.
The dissenting justices, although directing their entire argument against
compulsory recognition of a divorce granted in a state in which neither
petitioner -nor respondent were domiciled, seem largely to have assumed
the lack of domicile. At any rate, there was no compelling necessity to
decide the case upon that issue, and the constitutional validity of the charge,
denying credit to the Nevada decree under the conditions ennumerated, was
fairly put in question.
To the latter point the prevailing opinion was addressed exclusively,
with the express conclusion that Haddock v. Haddock should be and was
43. Williams v. North Carolina, 63 S. Ct. 207 (1942).
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overruled. The first premise of Justice Douglas' able opinion is that the
Constitution enjoins full, not some, credit to the judicial proceedings of the
sister state, which could only mean that a judgment should be accorded
elsewhere the same effect as it has in the state in which it is rendered.4
The proposition is one not easily attacked and the failure to observe it in
Haddock v. Haddock made that opinion particularly vulnerable. When
Professor Beale and the American Law Institute sought to justify the
Haddock decision, they rejected the position that a man and woman might
be divorced in one state but married in another, but in Williams v. North
Carolina, Justice Murphy, dissenting, contended that there was no Consti-
tutional obligation upon Nevada to enforce the bigamy laws of North Caro-
lina and the former might, if it chose, treat the parties as divorced for the
purpose of its own laws, without requiring North Carolina to do the same.
In this the Justice was confusing two distinct matters and "begging the
question" of them both. Nevada is free to disregard bigamy if it chooses,
but whether it (or North Carolina) may enact or enforce bigamy laws dis-
criminating against individuals because their marital status has been fixed by
another state, or whether Nevada (or North Carolina) may affect the
rights of an absent spouse in Nevada property without acquiring domiciliary
jurisdiction over the plaintiff in court, were the very questions at bar.
Justice Douglas reverted to Atherton v. Atherton for the statement that a
wife without a husband, or a husband without a wife, were unknown in the
law, an eminently sensible observation.
The second premise was that every state has jurisdiction to determine
the status of its own domiciliaries, and Maynard v. Hill was again restored
to favor. While none of the previous decisions involving the recognition
of a foreign decree have laid down this doctrine, as we have seen, yet
many state courts whose opinions were favorably cited therein had acted
upon it in determining their own jurisdiction, and until Haddock v. Had-
dock it was generally accepted among the legal profession. As that decision
expressly recognized that a divorce not within the scope of the full faith and
credit provision of the Constitution was not necessarily void under the
due process clause, the great majority of states have continued to accord
decrees rendered at the domicile of either party full credit as a matter of
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comity.4" Consequently, it is believed only a few states will be compelled,
by Williams v. North, Carolina, to recognize decrees they would not pre-
viously.
Divorce is an unhappy solution of marital difficulties at best, and it is
quite obvious that legalistic problems in jurisdiction to divorce are incapable
of satisfactory determination. The conflict between consideration for the
individuals involved and recognition of the interest of government has
already been mentioned. The divorce action is neither completely per-
sonal nor altogether in rem. Three further factors complicate the matter
in this country, (a) the modern and wholly desirable emancipation of the
married woman, who is increasingly competent to establish a separate domi-
cile, (b) the size of the nation, and (c) the federal character of the union.
In England, the domicile of a married woman is that of her husband; the
split domicile problems cannot arise; but who would pay their price for
such peace? If the nation were not so large, there would be less chance of
injustice to the spouse who remained at home, either in a divorce without
notice or in hardship in travelling to defend unjustified suits. If we were but
one sovereignty, jurisdiction would be unquestioned (Mexican and Parisian
divorces have raised only the issues of "no domicile," not "single domicile")
and the most acute question would be that of venue. The philosophy of the
Williams case, enlarging the operation of the full faith and credit clause,
plainly tends toward greater unification of the states. To let the merits of
the divorce controversy be settled by the first domiciliary state to exercise
jurisdiction is part of the price we pay for a federal union, though it
means that the status of the absent spouse is determined without the par-
ticipation and perhaps against the policy of the state of his or her domicile.
The sovereignty of every state is not absolute; it was the purpose of Article
IV to make us a single nation.
Adherents to the Restatement seem less jealous for the interest of the
state of the absent spouse's domicile than fairness to the spouse personally.
Presence or absence of fault in any party can not affect the concern which
a state has in his status. The court was reluctant to require investigation
of the merits of the divorce controversy, so transforming itself into a
divorce court, in order to test the jurisdiction of the court originally entering
the decree, but the argument is not sufficient justification in itself for re-
45. See GooDRIcn, CONFLICT OF LAws (2 ed. 1938) p. 348, n. 40, 41, 42.
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jecting a proposition presented as essential to the administration of justice.
But there must be an end to controversy, and unless a divorce action is so
far in personam as to require personal service on the defendant, recognition
of the integrity and interest of the first domiciliary court to pass on the
merits would seem to obviate necessity for reconsideration of them.
Justice Jackson's earnest and at times biting dissent never came to
grips with majority argument. In attacking the judgment for recognizing
a decree rendered in a state where neither party was domiciled, he struck
down a straw man. The prevailing opinion simply refused to argue the
question46 and the dissent did -not establish that it was in issue.
Hence we have no holding that divorce actions are perfectly transitory,
or that a recital of domicile in the decree of divorce itself is conclusive. 47
A few weeks before Williams v. North, Carolina was decided, the Supreme
Court of Missouri refused credit to a Nevada divorce on the ground that no
party had been domiciled there.48 No precedent of the Supreme Court con-
troverts that, and there is much dictum (possibly the holding) of Andrews
v. Andrews to support it.
Indeed, a most interesting implication of the Williams case is that such
a decree must not be recognized. 49 The test of jurisdiction, either for due
46. "Accordingly, we cannot avoid meeting the Haddock v. Haddock issue in
this case by saying that the petitioners acquired no bona fide domicil in Nevada.
If the case had been tried and submitted on that issue only, we would have had
quite a different problem, as Bell v. Bell indicates. We have no occasion to meet
that issue now and we intimate no opinions on it .... Rather we must treat the
present case for the purpose of the limited issue before us precisely the same as if
-petitioners had resided in Nevada for a term of years and had long ago acquired
a permanent abode there." Douglas, J., 63 S. Ct. at 210.
47. The dictum of the Douglas opinion would 'seem as much opposed to
divorce without domicile as the argument of the dissenters.
"The historical view that a proceeding for divorce was a proceeding in rem
was rejected by the Haddock case. We likewise agree that it does not aid in
the solution of the problem presented by this case to label these proceedings as
proceedings in rem. Such a suit, however, is not a mere in personam action. Dom-
icil of the plaintiff, immaterial to jurisdiction in a personal action, is recognized in
the Haddock case and elsewhere (Beale, Conflict of Laws, § 110.1) as essential in
order to give-the court jurisdiction which will entitle the divorce decree to extra-
territorial effect, at least when the defendant has neither been personally served
nor entered an appearance .... Hence the decrees in this case like other divorce
decrees are more than in personam judgments. They involve the marital status
of the parties ... ." 63 S. Ct. at 212, 213.
48. Wright v. Wright, 165 S. W. (2d) 870 (Mo. 1942).
49. What is the effect of the decision upon a statute like the following
"Any judgment or decree of divorce rendered upon service by publication in
any state of the United States in conformity with the law thereof shall be given
full faith and credit . . ." KAN. LAws (1907) ch. 184 § 1.
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process or full faith and credit, is the same; if the decree is not entitled to
the latter, it is everywhere void. But the point was not before the court;
the proposition suggested is but the conclusion of a syllogism premised on the
generalized abstractions propounded as the ratio decidendi of another case.
The record of stare decisis in jurisdiction to divorce would not justify too
much confidence on abstract logic if a different case-let us put that of the
gratuitous desire of a state to legitimatize the children of a subsequent mar-
riage of a party to such "void" divorce-came to the Supreme Court.
Too many lawyers have been educated to criticize Haddock v. Haddock
for there to be much indignation at its overthrow. And in the frank disre-
gard for the sanctity of precedent there was too much honest discussion of
the realities of the decision to justify any objection to the judicial technique.
Here Justice Jackson did join issue with his brethren. Discussing the effect
of the decision on the legitimacy of children, he remarked, "In any event
I had supposed that our judicial responsibility is for the regularity of the law,
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